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Abstract. This paper proposes new semantics for nondeterministic pro-
gram execution, replacing the standard relational semantics for propo-
sitional dynamic logic (PDL). Under these new semantics, program ex-
ecution is represented as fundamentally deterministic (i.e., functional),
while nondeterminism emerges as an epistemic relationship between the
agent and the system: intuitively, the nondeterministic outcomes of a
given process are precisely those that cannot be ruled out in advance.
We formalize these notions using topology and the framework of dynamic
topological logic (DTL) [1]. We show that DTL can be used to interpret
the language of PDL in a manner that captures the intuition above, and
moreover that continuous functions in this setting correspond exactly
to deterministic processes. We also prove that certain axiomatizations
of PDL remain sound and complete with respect to the corresponding
classes of dynamic topological models. Finally, we extend the framework
to incorporate knowledge using the machinery of subset space logic [2],
and show that the topological interpretation of public announcements
as given in [3] coincides exactly with a natural interpretation of test
programs.
1 Introduction
Propositional dynamic logic (PDL) is a framework for reasoning about the effects
of nondeterministic programs (or, more generally, nondeterministic actions). The
standard models for PDL are relational structures interpreted as state transition
diagrams: each program pi is associated with a binary relation Rpi on the state
space, and xRpiy means that state y is one possible result of executing pi in x.
1
1 See [4] for an overview of this branch of modal logic.
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What is the sense of “possibility” at play here? This paper explores an epis-
temic account. The standard models for PDL treat nondeterminism as a primi-
tive, unanalyzed notion: effectively, for each state x, pi is interpreted as nonde-
terministic at x just in case |{y : xRpiy}| > 1. But one might hope for a logic
that provides some insight into the nature and source of nondeterminism, rather
than simply stipulating its existence.
We investigate a richer class of models for nondeterministic program exe-
cution which differ from the standard models in two key respects: (1) states
completely determine the effects of actions, and (2) nondeterminism emerges,
loosely speaking, as a kind of epistemic relationship between a given agent (or
collection of agents) and the program (or action) in question. As we argue in the
next section, to make this relationship precise we need structures rich enough to
represent potential observations; for this we make use of topology. The resulting
framework is very closely related to dynamic topological logic (DTL) as developed
by Kremer and Mints [1]; roughly speaking, we show that DTL embeds a faith-
ful interpretation of PDL. Furthermore, we demonstrate that continuity in this
setting coincides exactly with the notion of determinism: that is, determinism is
continuity in the observation topology.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we review the
basics of PDL and present the intuitions that motivate the development of our
new models and the importance of “potential observations” in the epistemic in-
terpretation of nondeterminism. In Section 3 we motivate and review the use
of topology for this purpose, and connect it to dynamic topological logic. This
provides the tools we need to formalize our epistemic conception of nondeter-
minism and establish the correspondence between determinism and continuity
mentioned above. In Section 4 we transform PDL models into DTL models in
a manner that preserves the truth value of all PDL formulas, and use this to
prove that certain standard PDL axiomatizations are also sound and complete
with respect to corresponding classes of DTL models. In Section 5 we enrich
our semantics using the machinery of subset space logic [2] in order to reason
simultaneously about both knowledge and knowability in the context of nonde-
terministic program execution; furthermore, we show how public announcements
[5], appropriately generalized to the topological setting [3], can be captured us-
ing test programs. Section 6 concludes with a brief discussion of ongoing work.
Proofs and other details are collected in Appendix A.
2 Review and Motivation
Fix a countable set of primitive propositions prop and a countable set of pro-
grams Π. The language of PDL, denoted LPDL, is given by
ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ |ϕ ∧ ψ | 〈pi〉ϕ,
where p ∈ prop, pi ∈ Π, and 〈pi〉ϕ is read, “after some execution of pi, ϕ is
true”. Often Π is constructed from a set of more “basic” programs by closing
under certain operations, but for the moment we will take it for granted as a
structureless set. A (standard) PDL model is a relational frame (X, (Rpi)pi∈Π)
together with a valuation v : prop → 2X ; Boolean formulas are interpreted in
the usual way, while 〈pi〉 is interpreted as existential quantification over the Rpi-
accessible states:
x |= p iff x ∈ v(p)
x |= ¬ϕ iff x 6|= ϕ
x |= ϕ ∧ ψ iff x |= ϕ and x |= ψ
x |= 〈pi〉ϕ iff (∃y)(xRpiy and y |= ϕ).
Thus, 〈pi〉ϕ is true at a state x just in case some possible execution of pi at x
results in a ϕ-state.
Following standard conventions, we write [pi] as an abbreviation for ¬〈pi〉¬,
so we have
x |= [pi]ϕ iff (∀y)(xRpiy implies y |= ϕ).
We also treat Rpi as a set-valued function when convenient, with Rpi(x) = {y ∈
X : xRpiy}.
It is easy to adjust the standard models for PDL so that each state completely
determines the outcome of each action: simply replace the relations Rpi with
functions fpi : X → X. To emphasize this shift we introduce modalities #pi into
the language, reading #piϕ as “after execution of pi, ϕ holds”; these modalities
are interpreted using the functions fpi in the natural way:
x |= #piϕ iff fpi(x) |= ϕ.
Perhaps the most direct attempt to formalize nondeterminism as an epistemic
notion in this setting is to interpret the “nondeterministic outcomes” of pi to be
precisely those outcomes that the agent considers possible.
Somewhat more formally, supposing we have access to a knowledge modality
K with corresponding dual Kˆ (so Kˆϕ is read “the agent considers ϕ possible”),
we might define
〈pi〉ϕ ≡ Kˆ#piϕ.
Crucially, however, this seems to miss the essence of nondeterminism. For
instance, according to this definition, when the agent in question happens to be
very uncertain about pi, we are forced to interpret pi as having a great many
possible nondeterministic outcomes. But there is a clear conceptual distinction
between those outcomes of pi that are possible as far as some agent knows—
perhaps an agent with very poor information—as opposed to those outcomes that
would remain possible even with good information. And it seems to be the latter
concept that aligns more closely with our intuitions regarding nondeterminism.
For a simple example, imagine running a random number generator. This
seems like a canonical example of a nondeterministic process. Note that what
is important here is not merely that you do not, in fact, know what number
will be generated in advance, but also that you are unable in principle to de-
termine this in advance.2 By contrast, imagine running a program that queries
a given database and prints the result; we would not want to call this program
nondeterministic even if you happened to be ignorant about the contents of the
database.
This is a distinction we want to respect. The relevant epistemic notion, then,
is not what any given agent currently happens to know, but what they could come
to know. This is where topology comes in: the notion of “potential knowledge”
or “knowability” is naturally represented in topological spaces.
3 Topology, Dynamics, and Determinism
3.1 Topological Spaces and Models
A topological space is a set X together with a collection T ⊆ 2X of subsets
of X such that ∅, X ∈ T and T is closed under unions and finite intersections.
Elements of T are called open and T is called the topology.
There are various intuitions that help to make sense of this definition, most
of which tap into the notion of topology as the mathematics of physical space
and proximity.3 Here, though, we focus instead on epistemic intuitions, through
which topology is naturally interpreted as a formalization of evidence and poten-
tial observations. In fact, these two intuitions overlap in cases where the relevant
observations are measurements about locations in space.
Informally, if we think of X as a set of possible worlds encoding the potential
uncertainties one may have, then we can think of open sets U ∈ T as the results of
2 To be sure, if you had access to a more advanced set of tools than are standardly
available, perhaps you could make such a determination. And in this case, thinking
of the random number generator as a nondeterministic process loses much of its
intuitive appeal. Indeed, any nondeterministic process whatsoever might be viewed
as deterministic relative to a sufficiently powerful set of tools (e.g., from God’s
perspective). Thus, nondeterminism can be naturally construed as a relative notion
that depends on a fixed background set of “feasible measurements”. We make this
precise below.
3 For a standard introduction to topological notions, we refer the reader to [6].
measurements or observations. More precisely, we can understand U to represent
the observation that rules out precisely those worlds x /∈ U . On this view, each
U ∈ T corresponds to a possible state of knowledge, and the topology T itself
can be conceptualized as the set of available observations.4
A core notion in topology is that of the interior of a set A ⊆ X, defined by:
int(A) = {x ∈ A : (∃U ∈ T)(x ∈ U ⊆ A)}.
The interior of A therefore consists of those points x that are “robustly” inside
A, in the sense that there is some “witness” U ∈ T to x’s membership in A. When
we interpret elements of T as the results of possible measurements, the notion
of interior takes on a natural epistemic interpretation: x lies in the interior of A
just in case there is some measurement one could potentially take that would
entail A. In other words, the worlds in the interior of A are precisely the worlds
where A could come to be known.5
The dual of the interior operator is called closure:
cl(A) = X int(X A)
= {x ∈ X : (∀U ∈ T)(x ∈ U ⇒ U ∩A 6= ∅)}.
Thus, epistemically speaking, worlds in the closure of A are precisely those worlds
in which A is compatible with every possible measurement. The closure operator
therefore offers a mathematical realization of our intuition about nondetermin-
ism: namely, that a nondeterministic outcome of a program is one that remains
possible no matter how good the agent’s state of information.
A topological model M is a topological space (X,T) together with a valu-
ation v : prop→ 2X . In such models we interpret the basic modal language L2
defined by
ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ |ϕ ∧ ψ |2ϕ,
where p ∈ prop, via the usual recursive clauses for the Boolean connectives
together with the following addition:
x |= 2ϕ iff x ∈ int([[ϕ]]),
4 Suppose, for a simple example, that you measure your height and obtain a reading of
180± 2 cm. If we represent the space of your possible heights using the positive real
numbers, R+, then it is natural to identify this measurement with the open interval
(178, 182). And with this measurement in hand, you can safely deduce that you are,
for instance, less than 183 cm tall, while remaining uncertain about whether you
are, say, taller than 179 cm.
5 One might wonder about the closure conditions on topologies. Finite intersections
can perhaps be accounted for by identifying them with sequences of measurements,
but what about unions? One intuition comes by observing that for any set A,
int(A) =
⋃{U ∈ T : U ⊆ A}, so int(A) is the information state that arises from
learning that A is true without learning what particular measurement was taken to
ascertain this fact. This idea is formalized in [3] using public announcements; we
direct the reader to this work for a more detailed discussion of this point.
where [[ϕ]] = {x ∈ X : x |= ϕ}. We also make use of the dual modality 3,
defined by
x |= 3ϕ iff x ∈ cl([[ϕ]]).
Following the discussion above, we read 2ϕ as “ϕ is knowable” or “ϕ can be
ascertained” and 3ϕ as “ϕ is unfalsifiable” or “ϕ cannot be ruled out”.
3.2 Dynamic Topological Models
Kremer and Mints [1] introduce the notion of a dynamic topological model, which
is simply a topological model equipped with a continuous function f : X → X.
Since we wish to capture the execution of a multitude of programs, we generalize
this notion slightly to topological models equipped with a family of functions,
one for each program pi ∈ Π. Moreover, continuity is not something we will want
to take for granted; we therefore drop this requirement as well.
A dynamic topological model is a tuple (X,T, {fpi}pi∈Π , v) where (X,T, v)
is a topological model and each fpi : X → X. In such models we can interpret
the language L2,# defined by
ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ |ϕ ∧ ψ |2ϕ |#piϕ,
where p ∈ prop and pi ∈ Π, via the additional semantic clause:
x |= #piϕ iff fpi(x) |= ϕ.
This provides the final tool we need to formalize the re-interpretation of nonde-
terministic program execution sketched in Section 2:
〈pi〉ϕ ≡ 3#piϕ.
Semantically:
x |= 〈pi〉ϕ iff x |= 3#piϕ
iff x ∈ cl(f−1pi ([[ϕ]])).
So: ϕ is a nondeterministic outcome of pi (at x) just in case it cannot be ruled out
(at x) that ϕ will hold after pi is executed. Topologically: every measurement at x
(i.e., every open neighbourhood of x) is compatible with a state where ϕ results
from executing pi. Call this the epistemic interpretation of nondeterminism.
3.3 Determinism as Continuity
The epistemic interpretation of nondeterminism accords with our earlier intu-
itions about random number generators and database queries. Consider a process
rand that randomly displays either a 0 or a 1, and an agent who (we presume) is
unable to measure in advance the relevant quantities that determine the output
of this process. This means that both #rand0 and #rand1 are compatible with
every measurement the agent can take (in advance of running the process), so3#rand0 and 3#rand1 both hold, i.e., 〈rand〉0∧ 〈rand〉1. By contrast, consider
a process query that outputs the next entry in a given database and an agent
who can look up that entry in advance (which is, say, 0). This means there is a
measurement that guarantees #query0, so 2#query0 holds, which yields [query]0.
What exactly is (non)determinism in this setting? It is tempting to describe
a (non)deterministic process as one in which the output state can(not) be de-
termined in advance. But this is far too liberal: in principle, states may encode
many details that are far beyond the ability of the agent to measure precisely,
which would then trivially render every process nondeterministic. For instance,
if the state description encodes the current temperature of some internal compo-
nents of the system (e.g., as a seed value for the rand process), then even after
executing a simple program like query the user will not be in a position to know
the true state.
The correct notion is more subtle. Consider again the rand process: the
crucial feature of this program is not that it produces a state that cannot be
determined in advance, but that it produces a measurable quantity—namely, the
number displayed—that cannot be determined in advance.
To make the same point slightly more formally: it may be that no measure-
ment at x rules out all the other states (indeed, this will be the case whenever
{x} is not open). This is necessary but not sufficient for nondeterminism because
it may still be possible to learn (in advance) everything there is to know about
the effects of executing pi (as describable in the language).
This suggests the following refined account of determinism: a deterministic
process is one in which everything one could learn about the state of the system
after the program is executed one can also determine in advance of the program
execution.
This account aligns perfectly with the topological notion of continuity. In-
tuitively: a function is continuous if small changes in the input produce small
changes in the output. Topologically: f is continuous at x if, for every open
neighbourhood V of f(x), there exists an open neighbourhood U of x such that
f(U) ⊆ V . And, finally, epistemically: f is continuous at x if every measurement
V compatible with the output state f(x) can be guaranteed in advance by some
measurement U compatible with the input state x. So the definition of continu-
ity corresponds exactly to our refined account of determinism. In other words:
determinism is continuity in the observation topology.
Continuity of fpi can be defined in the object language L2,# by the formula
#pi2ϕ→ 2#piϕ.6
Unsurprisingly, this is precisely the scheme that Kremer and Mints call “the
axiom of continuity” in their axiomatization of the class of (continuous) dynamic
topological models [1]. It reads: “If, after executing pi, ϕ is (not only true, but
also) measurably true, then it is possible to take a measurement before executing
6 This claim is made precise and proved in Appendix A.1.
pi that guarantees that ϕ will be true after executing pi.” So this scheme expresses
the idea that one need not actually execute pi in order to determine whatever
could be determined after its execution: all the measurable effects of pi can be
determined in advance. Again, this is determinism. Continuity is determinism.
4 Axiomatization and Model Transformation
We restrict our attention in this section to serial PDL models, in which each
Rpi is serial: (∀x)(∃y)(xRpiy). Thus, we rule out the possibility of a program pi
producing no output at all in some states (intuitively, “crashing”), which corre-
sponds to the fact that the functions in dynamic topological models are assumed
to be total (i.e., everywhere defined). This allows for a cleaner translation be-
tween the two paradigms; in Section 5 we consider a framework that drops this
assumption.
Table 1. Axioms and rules of inference for SPDL0
(CPL) all propositional tautologies Classical propositional logic
(Kpi) [pi](ϕ→ ψ)→ ([pi]ϕ→ [pi]ψ) Distribution
(Dpi) [pi]ϕ→ 〈pi〉ϕ Seriality
(MP) from ϕ and ϕ→ ψ deduce ψ Modus ponens
(Necpi) from ϕ deduce [pi]ϕ Necessitation
The most basic version of serial PDL (without any operations on programs)
is axiomatized by the axioms and rules of inference given in Table 1. Call this
system SPDL0.
Theorem 1. SPDL0 is a sound and complete axiomatization of the language
LPDL with respect to the class of all serial PDL models.
7
Using the epistemic interpretation of nondeterminism given in Section 3.2,
we can also interpret the language LPDL directly in dynamic topological models:
x |= 〈pi〉ϕ iff x ∈ cl(f−1pi ([[ϕ]])).
And, dually:
x |= [pi]ϕ iff x ∈ int(f−1pi ([[ϕ]])).
This puts us in a position to evaluate our re-interpretation in a precise way.
Namely, we can ask: are all the properties of nondeterministic program execution
that are captured by standard (serial) PDL models preserved under this new
interpretation? And we can answer in the affirmative:
7 This can be proved using very standard techniques; see, e.g., [7].
Theorem 2. SPDL0 is a sound and complete axiomatization of the language
LPDL with respect to the class of all dynamic topological models.
Proof. Soundness of (CPL) and (MP) is immediate. Soundness of (Necpi) follows
from the fact that f−1pi (X) = X and int(X) = X, and soundness of (Dpi) follows
from the fact that, for all A ⊆ X, int(A) ⊆ cl(A). Finally, to see that (Kpi) is
sound, observe that
int(f−1pi ([[ϕ→ ψ]])) ∩ int(f−1pi ([[ϕ]])) = int(f−1pi ([[ϕ→ ψ]]) ∩ f−1pi ([[ϕ]]))
⊆ int(f−1pi ([[ψ]])).
The proof of completeness proceeds by way of a model-transformation construc-
tion we provide in Appendix A.2: specifically, we show that every serial PDL
model can be transformed into a dynamic topological model in a manner that
preserves the truth of all formulas in LPDL (Proposition 2). By Theorem 1,
every non-theorem of SPDL0 is refuted on some serial PDL model, so our trans-
formation produces a dynamic topological model that refutes the same formula,
thereby establishing completeness. uunionsq
Typically one works with richer versions of PDL in which the set of programs
Π is equipped with one or more operations corresponding, intuitively, to ways
of building new programs from old programs. Standard examples include:
– Sequencing : pi1;pi2 executes pi1 followed immediately by pi2.
– Nondeterministic union: pi1 ∪ pi2 nondeterministically chooses to execute ei-
ther pi1 or pi2.
– Iteration: pi∗ repeatedly executes pi some nondeterministic finite number of
times.
Can we make sense of these operations in our enriched epistemic setting? The lat-
ter two transform deterministic programs into nondeterministic programs, and
for this reason they are difficult to interpret in a setting where program execu-
tion is fundamentally deterministic (i.e., interpreted by functions). We return to
discuss this point in Section 6. Sequencing, on the other hand, does not have
this issue; one might guess that it is straightforwardly captured by the condition
fpi1;pi2 = fpi2 ◦ fpi1 .
While function composition certainly seems like the natural way to interpret
sequential program execution, there is a wrinkle in the axiomatization. PDL with
sequencing is axiomatized by including the following axiom scheme:
(Seq) 〈pi1;pi2〉ϕ↔ 〈pi1〉〈pi2〉ϕ.
Interestingly, this scheme is not valid in arbitary dynamic topological models.
This is because
[[〈pi1;pi2〉ϕ]] = cl(f−1pi1;pi2([[ϕ]])) = cl(f−1pi1 (f−1pi2 ([[ϕ]]))),
whereas
[[〈pi1〉〈pi2〉ϕ]] = cl(f−1pi1 (cl(f−1pi2 ([[ϕ]]))));
the extra closure operator means we have
[[〈pi1;pi2〉ϕ]] ⊆ [[〈pi1〉〈pi2〉ϕ]]
but not, in general, equality.
A function f : X → Y is called open if for every open subset U ⊆ X, the set
f(U) is open in Y . It turns out that when the function fpi1 is open, the mismatch
above vanishes (all of the following claims are proved in Appendix A.3):
Lemma 1. Let (X,T, {fpi}pi∈Π , v) be a dynamic topological model. If fpi1 is
open, then
[[〈pi1;pi2〉ϕ]] = [[〈pi1〉〈pi2〉ϕ]].
Say that a dynamic topological model is open if each fpi is open.
Theorem 3. SPDL0 + (Seq) is a sound and complete axiomatization of the
language LPDL with respect to the class of all open dynamic topological models.
Like continuity, openness of the function fpi can be defined in the object
language; in fact, it is defined by the converse of the scheme defining continuity:
2#piϕ→ #pi2ϕ.
Roughly speaking, this says that whatever you can (in principle) predict about
executing pi beforehand you could also come to know afterward. This has a
“perfect recall” type flavour, except the relevant epistemic notion is not what is
actually known but what could come to be known. Besides serving to validate the
standard sequencing axiom, this principle also plays a crucial role in the next
section, where we extend the present framework to incorporate knowledge.
5 Knowledge and Learning
To study the epistemology of nondeterministic program execution, we want to be
able to reason not only about what can be known, but also about what is known.
To do so we need a richer semantic setting, for which we turn to topological subset
models [2]; essentially, these use an additional parameter to keep track of the
current state of information, through which a standard knowledge modality can
be interpreted.
Topological subset models have experienced renewed interest in recent years
[3,8,9,10], beginning with the work in [3] studying public announcements in the
topological setting. Standard semantics for public announcement logic take the
precondition of an announcement of ϕ to be the truth of ϕ; in the topological
setting, this precondition is strengthened to the knowability of ϕ. As we will
see, this interpretation of public announcements is recapitulated in the present
framework via a natural interpretation of test programs.
5.1 Incorporating Knowledge
A topological subset model just is a topological model (X,T, v); the differ-
ence lies in the semantic clauses for truth, which are defined with respect to pairs
of the form (x, U), where x ∈ U ∈ T; such pairs are called epistemic scenarios.
Intuitively, x represents the actual world, while U captures the agent’s current
information and thus what they know. Formally, we interpret the language LK,2
given by
ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ |ϕ ∧ ψ |Kϕ |2ϕ,
where p ∈ prop, as follows:
(x, U) |= p iff x ∈ v(p)
(x, U) |= ¬ϕ iff (x, U) 6|= ϕ
(x, U) |= ϕ ∧ ψ iff (x, U) |= ϕ and (x, U) |= ψ
(x, U) |= Kϕ iff U ⊆ [[ϕ]]U
(x, U) |= 2ϕ iff x ∈ int([[ϕ]]U ),
where [[ϕ]]U = {x ∈ U : (x, U) |= ϕ}. So the agent knows ϕ in the epistemic
scenario (x, U) just in case it is guaranteed by their current information U .
We next define dynamic topological subset models by incorporating functions
fpi as above. Of course, we need subset-style semantics for the dynamic modal-
ities. Perhaps the most natural way to define the updated epistemic scenario is
as follows:
(x, U) |= #piϕ iff (fpi(x), fpi(U)) |= ϕ.
This definition raises two issues, one technical and the other conceptual.
First, as a technical matter, the definition only makes sense if fpi(U) is open—
otherwise (fpi(x), fpi(U)) is not an epistemic scenario. So we have here another
reason to restrict our attention to open functions fpi.
Second, conceptually, in a sense this framework does not permit learning.
True, an agent’s state of knowledge changes in accordance with program ex-
ecution, but every “live” possibility y ∈ U is preserved as the corresponding
state fpi(y) in the updated information set fpi(U). Intuitively, then, the agent
can never truly eliminate possibilities.
Dynamic epistemic logic [11] is a modern and vibrant area of research con-
cerned exactly with this issue of how to capture the dynamics of information up-
date. But rather than explicitly importing machinery from this paradigm (e.g.,
announcements) to represent learning in the present context, we can take ad-
vantage of a mechanic that PDL already has available: crashing. In Section 4 we
restricted attention to standard PDL models that were serial, corresponding in
our framework to total functions. We now drop this assumption to allow partial
functions fpi : X ⇀ X that are undefined at some points in X. This allows the
corresponding updates to effectively delete states and thus capture information
update in much the same way that, e.g., public announcements do.
A dynamic topological subset model (over Π) is a topological subset
model together with a family of partial, open functions8 fpi : X ⇀ X, pi ∈ Π.
Formulas of the language LK,2,# given by
ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ |ϕ ∧ ψ |Kϕ |2ϕ |#piϕ,
are interpreted at epistemic scenarios via the semantic clauses introduced above,
taking care to note that the righthand side of the clause defining #pi now carries
the implicit assumption that fpi(x) is actually defined. We provide a sound and
complete axiomatization of this logic in Appendix A.4.
5.2 Test Programs and Public Announcements
A standard enrichment of PDL expands the set of programs Π to include test
programs. Unlike other program constructions, test programs are not built from
existing programs but instead from formulas in the language: given a formula ϕ,
the program ϕ? is introduced to be interpreted by the relation Rϕ? defined by
xRϕ?y iff x = y and x |= ϕ.
Intuitively, the program ϕ? crashes at states where ϕ is false, and otherwise does
nothing.
Test programs are deterministic, so can be represented just as easily by func-
tions:
fϕ?(x) =
{
x if x |= ϕ
undefined otherwise.
But to make sense of this definition in dynamic topological subset models, two
issues must be addressed. First, the relation x |= ϕ is not actually defined in
subset models—formulas are evaluated with respect to epistemic scenarios, not
individual states. However, it is easy to see that when ϕ belongs the fragment
L2,#, its truth in an epistemic scenario (x, U) is independent of U ; in this case,
we can simply declare that x |= ϕ iff (x, U) |= ϕ for some (equivalently, all)
open sets U containing x. We therefore restrict the formation of test programs
to ϕ ∈ L2,#.
Second, fϕ? may not be open. Indeed, fϕ? is open just in case [[ϕ]] = {x : x |=
ϕ} is open. If [[ϕ]] is not open then it contains at least one state x ∈ [[ϕ]] int([[ϕ]]),
that is, a state at which ϕ is true but not measurably true. Intuitively, at such
states the test program ϕ? should crash, since it must fail to determine that ϕ
is true. This motivates the following revised definition of fϕ?:
fϕ?(x) =
{
x if x ∈ int([[ϕ]])
undefined otherwise.
8 Typically the concept of openness is applied to total functions, but the definition
makes sense for partial functions as well: f is open provided, for all open U , f(U) =
{y ∈ X : (∃x ∈ U)(f(x) = y)} is open.
These functions are open. Moreover, under these revised semantics, we have:
(x, U) |= #ϕ?ψ iff (fϕ?(x), fϕ?(U)) |= ψ
iff x ∈ int([[ϕ]]) and (x, U ∩ int([[ϕ]])) |= ψ,
which coincides exactly with the topological definition of a public announcement
of ϕ as given in [3].9
6 Future Work
We have formalized a relatively simple idea: namely, that the nondeterministic
outcomes of a process are precisely those that the agent cannot rule out in ad-
vance. Using the tools of topology to represent potential observations, we have
demonstrated a striking connection between deterministic processes and contin-
uous functions, proved that certain axiomatizations of PDL remain sound and
complete when reinterpreted in this enriched setting, and established a natural
identity between test programs and public announcements.
Many questions remain, both conceptual and technical. What is the relation-
ship between the (probabilistic) notion of chance and the topological construal
of nondeterminism presented here? Is there a way to import “nondeterministic”
operations on programs, such as nondeterministic union or iteration, into this
setting? Or is it perhaps better to focus on deterministic analogues of these
program constructions, such as, “If ϕ do pi1, else do pi2”, or, “Do pi until ϕ”?
How much of dynamic epistemic logic can be recovered as program execution in
dynamic topological subset models? For instance, can we make sense of test pro-
grams based on epistemic formulas (i.e., formulas that include the K modality),
as we can with public announcements? And how can we extend the axiomati-
zation of dynamic topological subset models given in Appendix A.4 to include
test programs? These questions and more are the subject of ongoing research.
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A Proofs and Details
A.1 Characterizing continuity
A dynamic topological frame (over Π) is a tuple F = (X,T, {fpi}pi∈Π)
where (X,T) is a topological space and each fpi : X → X. In other words, a
frame is simply a dynamic topological model without a valuation function. A
frame F is said to validate a formula ϕ just in case ϕ is true at every point of
every model of the form (F, v).
Proposition 1. The formula scheme #pi2ϕ → 2#piϕ defines the class of dy-
namic topological frames in which fpi is continuous: that is, for every dynamic
topological frame F , F validates every instance of #pi2ϕ → 2#piϕ iff fpi is
continuous.
Proof. First suppose that M is a dynamic topological model in which fpi is
continuous, and let x be a point in this model satisfying #pi2ϕ. Then fpi(x) ∈
int([[ϕ]]). By continuity, the set U = f−1pi (int([[ϕ]])) is open. Moreover, it is easy
to see that x ∈ U and U ⊆ [[#piϕ]], from which it follows that x |= 2#piϕ.
Conversely, suppose that F is a dynamic topological frame in which fpi is
not continuous. Let U be an open subset of X such that A = f−1pi (U) is not
open, and let x ∈ A int(A); consider a valuation v such that v(p) = U . In the
resulting model, since fpi(x) ∈ U = int(U), we have x |= #pi2p. On the other
hand, since by definition x /∈ int(f−1pi (U)), we have x 6|= 2#pip. uunionsq
A.2 Model transformation
Our task in this section is to transform an arbitrary serial PDL model into
a dynamic topological model in a truth-preserving manner. The intuition for
this transformation is fairly straightforward: in a serial PDL model, each state
may be nondeterministically compatible with many possible execution paths
corresponding to all the possible ways of successively traversing Rpi-edges. In
a dynamic topological model, by contrast, all such execution paths must be
differentiated by state—roughly speaking, this means we need to create a new
state for each possible execution path in the standard model. Then, to preserve
the original notion of nondeterminism, we overlay a topological structure that
“remembers” which new states originated from the same state in the standard
model by rendering them topologically indistinguishable.
Let M = (X, (Rpi)pi∈Π , v) be a serial PDL model. Let Π∗ denote the set of
all finite sequences from Π. A map α : Π∗ → X is called a network (through
M) provided (∀~pi ∈ Π∗)(∀pi ∈ Π)(α(~pi)Rpiα(~pi, pi)). In other words, a network
α must respect Rpi-edges in the sense that it associates with each sequence
(pi1, . . . , pin) a path (x1, . . . , xn+1) through X such that, for each i, xiRpiixi+1.
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Networks through M constitute the points of the dynamic topological model we
are building:
X˜ = {α : α is a network through M .}.
The topology we equip X˜ with is particularly simple: for each x ∈ X, let
Ux = {α ∈ X˜ : α(∅) = x}. Clearly the sets Ux partition X and so form a
topological basis; let T be the topology they generate.
Next we define the functions fpi : X˜ → X˜. Intuitively, α ∈ X˜ is a complete
record of what paths will be traversed in the original state space X for every
sequence of program executions. Therefore, after executing pi, the updated record
fpi(α) should simply consist in those paths determined by α that start with an
execution of pi:
fpi(α)(~pi) = α(pi, ~pi).
Finally, define v˜ : prop→ 2X˜ by
v˜(p) = {α ∈ X˜ : α(∅) ∈ v(p)}.
Let M˜ = (X˜,T, (fpi)pi∈Π , v˜).
Proposition 2. For every ϕ ∈ LPDL, for every α ∈ X˜, (M˜, α) |= ϕ iff (M,α(∅)) |=
ϕ.
Proof. We proceed by induction on the structure of ϕ. The base case when
ϕ = p ∈ prop follows directly from the definition of v˜:
(M˜, α) |= p iff α ∈ v˜(p)
iff α(∅) ∈ v(p)
iff (M,α(∅)) |= p.
10 Specifically, x1 = α(∅) and (∀i ≥ 2)(xi = α(x1, . . . , xi−1)).
The inductive steps for the Boolean connectives are straightforward. So suppose
inductively that the result holds for ϕ; we wish to show it holds for 〈pi〉ϕ.
Let α ∈ X˜ and x = α(∅). By definition, (M˜, α) |= 〈pi〉ϕ iff α ∈ cl(f−1pi ([[ϕ]]M˜ )).
Since the topology is generated by a partition, we know that Ux is a minimal
neighbourhood of α, and therefore the preceding condition is equivalent to:
Ux ∩ f−1pi ([[ϕ]]M˜ ) 6= ∅.
This intersection is nonempty just in case there exists an α′ ∈ X˜ such that
α′(∅) = x and fpi(α′) ∈ [[ϕ]]M˜ . By the induction hypothesis,
fpi(α
′) ∈ [[ϕ]]M˜ iff (M˜, fpi(α′)) |= ϕ
iff (M,fpi(α
′)(∅)) |= ϕ
iff (M,α′(pi)) |= ϕ.
So to summarize, we have shown that (M˜, α) |= 〈pi〉ϕ iff there exists an α′ ∈ X˜
such that α′(∅) = x and (M,α′(pi)) |= ϕ. Since we know that α′(∅)Rpiα′(pi), this
is in turn equivalent to (M,x) |= 〈pi〉ϕ, which completes the induction. uunionsq
A.3 Sequencing
Lemma 1 Let (X,T, {fpi}pi∈Π , v) be a dynamic topological model. If fpi1 is open,
then
[[〈pi1;pi2〉ϕ]] = [[〈pi1〉〈pi2〉ϕ]].
Proof. It suffices to show that [[〈pi1;pi2〉ϕ]] ⊇ [[〈pi1〉〈pi2〉ϕ]]. So let
x ∈ [[〈pi1〉〈pi2〉ϕ]] = cl(f−1pi1 (cl(f−1pi2 ([[ϕ]]))));
then for every open neighbourhood U containing x, we know that U∩f−1pi1 (cl(f−1pi2 ([[ϕ]]))) 6=∅. This implies that fpi1(U) ∩ cl(f−1pi2 ([[ϕ]])) 6= ∅; since fpi1(U) is open, it follows
that fpi1(U)∩f−1pi2 ([[ϕ]]) 6= ∅ as well. This then implies that U∩f−1pi1 (f−1pi2 ([[ϕ]])) 6= ∅,
and therefore
x ∈ cl(f−1pi1 (f−1pi2 ([[ϕ]]))) = [[〈pi1;pi2〉ϕ]],
as desired. uunionsq
Say that a dynamic topological model is open if each fpi is open.
Theorem 3 SPDL0 + (Seq) is a sound and complete axiomatization of the lan-
guage LPDL with respect to the class of all open dynamic topological models.
Proof. Lemma 1 shows that (Seq) is valid in the class of all open dynamic topo-
logical models. For completeness, it suffices to observe that the dynamic topo-
logical model M˜ constructed in Appendix A.2 is itself open: indeed, for each
basic open Ux, we have
fpi(Ux) = {α ∈ X˜ : xRpiα(∅)}
=
⋃
y∈R(x)
Uy,
which of course is open. uunionsq
Proposition 3. The formula scheme 2#piϕ → #pi2ϕ defines the class of dy-
namic topological frames in which fpi is open: that is, for every dynamic topo-
logical frame F , F validates every instance of 2#piϕ→ #pi2ϕ iff fpi is open.
Proof. First suppose that M is a dynamic topological model in which fpi is open,
and let x be a point in this model satisfying 2#piϕ. Then x ∈ int(f−1pi ([[ϕ]])). By
openness, the set V = f(int(f−1pi ([[ϕ]]))) is open. Moreover, it is easy to see that
fpi(x) ∈ V and V ⊆ [[ϕ]], from which it follows that x |= #pi2ϕ.
Conversely, suppose that F is a dynamic topological frame in which fpi is not
open. Let U be an open subset of X such that A = fpi(U) is not open, and let
x ∈ U be such that fpi(x) ∈ A int(A); consider a valuation v such that v(p) = A.
In the resulting model, since x ∈ U and f(U) ⊆ [[p]], we have x |= 2#pip. On the
other hand, since by definition fpi(x) /∈ int([[p]]), we have x 6|= #pi2p. uunionsq
A.4 Dynamic Topological Epistemic Logic
In this section we provide a sound and complete axiomatization of the language
LK,2,# with respect to the class of all dynamic topological subset models.
Let CPL denote the axioms and rules of classical propositional logic, let S5K
denote the S5 axioms and rules for the K modality, and let S42 denote the S4
axioms and rules for the 2 modality (see, e.g., [7]). Let (KI) denote the axiom
scheme Kϕ→ 2ϕ, and set
ELK,2 := CPL + S5K + S42 + (KI).
Theorem 4 ([3, Theorem 1]). ELK,2 is a sound and complete axiomatization
of LK,2 with respect to the class of all dynamic topological subset models.
Let DTEL denote the axiom system ELK,2 together with the axiom schemes
and rules of inference given in Table 2.
Table 2. Additional axioms and rules of inference for DTEL
(¬-PCpi) #pi¬ϕ↔ (¬#piϕ ∧#pi>) Partial commutativity of ¬
(∧-Cpi) #pi(ϕ ∧ ψ)↔ (#piϕ ∧#piψ) Commutativity of ∧
(K-PCpi) #pi> → (#piKϕ↔ K(#pi> → #piϕ)) Partial commutativity of K
(Opi) (2¬#piϕ ∧#pi>)→ #pi2¬ϕ Openness
(Monpi) from ϕ→ ψ deduce #piϕ→ #piψ Monotonicity
Theorem 5. DTEL is a sound and complete axiomatization of LK,2,# with re-
spect to the class of all dynamic topological subset models.
Proof. Soundness of ELK,2 follows as in the proof given in [3, Theorem 1], while
soundness of the additions presented in Table 2 is easy to check. The presence of#pi> in (¬-PCpi) accounts for the fact that fpi can be partial (since both ¬#piϕ
and ¬#pi¬ϕ are true at states where fpi is undefined), and plays an analogous
role in (K-PCpi) and (Opi). Similarly, the usual “necessitation” rule for #pi is not
valid, since even if ϕ is a theorem, #piϕ still fails at states where fpi is undefined.
Completeness is proved by a canonical model construction. Let X denote the
set of all maximal DTEL-consistent subsets of LK,2,#. Define a binary relation
∼ on X by
x ∼ y ⇔ (∀ϕ ∈ LK,2,#)(Kϕ ∈ x⇔ Kϕ ∈ y).
Clearly ∼ is an equivalence relation; let [x] denote the equivalence class of x
under ∼. For each x ∈ X, define
R(x) = {y ∈ X : (∀ϕ ∈ LK,2,#)(2ϕ ∈ x⇒ ϕ ∈ y)}.
Let B = {R(x) : x ∈ X}, and let T be the topology generated by B. It is easy to
check that B is a basis for T, and each R(x) is a minimal neighbourhood about
x (see, e.g., [12]). Given x ∈ X, define
fpi(x) =
{{ϕ : #piϕ ∈ x} if #pi> ∈ x
undefined otherwise.
The following lemmas establishes that each fpi is a partial, open function
X ⇀ X.
Lemma 2. Whenever fpi(x) is defined, it is maximal DTEL-consistent.
Proof. First suppose for contradiction that ϕ1, . . . , ϕk ∈ fpi(x) are inconsistent.
Then #piϕ1, . . . ,#piϕk ∈ x, so it follows that #piϕ1∧· · ·∧#piϕk ∈ x, and therefore
(using (∧-Cpi)) #pi(ϕ1 ∧ · · · ∧ ϕk) ∈ x. Now we know by assumption that
`DTEL (ϕ1 ∧ · · · ∧ ϕk)→ ¬>,
so by (Monpi)
`DTEL #pi(ϕ1 ∧ · · · ∧ ϕk)→ #pi¬>,
which implies that #pi¬> ∈ x. Now (¬-PCpi) implies that ¬#pi> ∧ #pi> ∈ x,
contradicting consistency of x. This shows that fpi(x) is consistent.
Next suppose for contradiction that ϕ /∈ fpi(x) and ¬ϕ /∈ fpi(x). Then #piϕ /∈
x and #pi¬ϕ /∈ x, so ¬#piϕ ∈ x and ¬#pi¬ϕ ∈ x. Since fpi(x) is defined we
know that #pi> ∈ x, so we have ¬#piϕ ∧ #pi> ∈ x and ¬#pi¬ϕ ∧ #pi> ∈ x.
Therefore, by (¬-PCpi), we have#pi¬ϕ ∈ x and#pi¬¬ϕ ∈ x. But this implies that
¬ϕ ∈ fpi(x) and ¬¬ϕ ∈ fpi(x), contradicting consistency and thereby establishing
maximality. uunionsq
Lemma 3. For each x ∈ X, fpi(R(x)) ∈ T.
Proof. Let z ∈ fpi(R(x)) and let z′ ∈ R(z); it suffices to show that z′ ∈ fpi(R(x)).
By choice of z, there exists y ∈ R(x) with z = fpi(y) = {ϕ : #piϕ ∈ y}. We wish
to find a y′ ∈ R(x) with fpi(y′) = z′. To this end, consider the set
Γ = {ψ : 2ψ ∈ x} ∪ {#piχ : χ ∈ z′}.
It is not hard to see that if y′ ⊇ Γ then y′ has the desired properties; by
Lindenbaum’s lemma, we will therefore be done if we can show that Γ is DTEL-
consistent.
Suppose not. Then there are ψ1, . . . , ψn ∈ {ψ : 2ψ ∈ x} and#piχ1, . . . ,#piχm ∈
{#piχ : χ ∈ z′} such that
`DTEL (ψ1 ∧ · · · ∧ ψn)→ ¬(#piχ1 ∧ · · · ∧#piχm),
so by (∧-Cpi),
`DTEL (ψ1 ∧ · · · ∧ ψn)→ ¬#pi(χ1 ∧ · · · ∧ χm),
hence (using S42)
`DTEL (2ψ1 ∧ · · · ∧2ψn)→ 2¬#pi(χ1 ∧ · · · ∧ χm).
Now each 2ψi is contained in x, and therefore also in y; it follows that 2¬#pi(χ1∧
· · · ∧ χm) ∈ y as well; moreover, since fpi(y) = z, we have #pi> ∈ y, so by (Opi)
we obtain #pi2¬(χ1 ∧ · · · ∧ χm) ∈ y and therefore 2¬(χ1 ∧ · · · ∧ χm) ∈ z, hence
¬(χ1 ∧ · · · ∧ χm) ∈ z′, a contradiction. uunionsq
For each p ∈ prop, set v(p) := {x ∈ X : p ∈ x}. Let X = (X,T, {fpi}pi∈Π , v).
Clearly X is a dynamic topological subset model.
Lemma 4 (Truth Lemma). For every ϕ ∈ LK,2,#, for all x ∈ X, ϕ ∈ x iff
(X, x, [x]) |= ϕ.
Proof. First we show that y ∈ R(x) ⇒ y ∼ x. Let y ∈ R(x). If Kψ ∈ x then
KKψ ∈ x, so 2Kψ ∈ x and therefore Kψ ∈ y; conversely, if ¬Kψ ∈ x then
K¬Kψ ∈ x, so 2¬Kψ ∈ x and therefore ¬Kψ ∈ y. Note that this implies that
[x] ∈ T, so (x, [x]) is indeed an epistemic scenario.
The proof proceeds by induction on the structure of ϕ. The base case holds by
definition of v, and the inductive steps for the Boolean connectives are straight-
forward. The inductive step for K mirrors exactly the corresponding step in [3,
Theorem 1].
So suppose inductively the result holds for ϕ and let us show it holds for2ϕ. If 2ϕ ∈ x then by definition of R we know that for every y ∈ R(x), ϕ ∈ y.
By the inductive hypothesis, this implies that (∀y ∈ R(x))(y, [y]) |= ϕ; since
y ∈ R(x)⇒ y ∼ x, this is equivalent to (∀y ∈ R(x))((y, [x]) |= ϕ); since R(x) is
an open neighbourhood of x, this yields (x, [x]) |= 2ϕ.
For the converse, suppose that 2ϕ /∈ x. Then
{ψ : 2ψ ∈ x} ∪ {¬ϕ}
is consistent, for if not there are ψ1, . . . , ψm ∈ {ψ : 2ψ ∈ x} such that
`DTEL ψ1 ∧ · · · ∧ ψm → ϕ,
from which it follows that
`DTEL 2ψ1 ∧ · · · ∧2ψm → 2ϕ,
which implies 2ϕ ∈ x, a contradiction. By Lindenbaum’s lemma, we therefore
obtain a point y ∈ X with y ∈ R(x) and ϕ /∈ y. This latter fact, by the inductive
hypothesis, yields (y, [y]) 6|= ϕ and thus (y, [x]) 6|= ϕ (since y ∼ x), which in turn
yields (x, [x]) 6|= 2ϕ since R(x) is a minimal neighbourhood of x.
For the last inductive step a lemma will be useful.
Lemma 5. For all x ∈ X, if fpi(x) is defined then fpi([x]) = [fpi(x)].
Proof. First suppose that z ∈ fpi([x]), so there is some y ∼ x such that fpi(y) = z.
We need to show that z ∼ fpi(x). If Kψ ∈ z then so is KKψ, so #piKKψ ∈ y;
since fpi(y) is defined, certainly #pi> ∈ y, and therefore by (K-PCpi) we can
deduce that K(#pi> → #piKψ) ∈ y. Since y ∼ x, this implies that #pi> →#piKψ ∈ x, and therefore (since fpi(x) is defined), #piKψ ∈ x, hence Kψ ∈
fpi(x). An analogous argument shows that if ¬Kψ ∈ z then ¬Kψ ∈ fpi(x),
which establishes that z ∼ fpi(x).
Conversely, suppose that z ∼ fpi(x); we wish to show that there exists a
y ∈ [x] such that fpi(y) = z. Using Lindenbaum’s lemma, we will be done if we
can show that the set
{Kψ : Kψ ∈ x} ∪ {#piχ : χ ∈ z}
is DTEL-consistent. So suppose not; then there are Kψ1, . . . ,Kψn ∈ {Kψ :
Kψ ∈ x} and #piχ1, . . . ,#piχm,#pi> ∈ {#piχ : χ ∈ z} such that
`DTEL (Kψ1 ∧ · · · ∧Kψn)→ (#pi> → ¬(#piχ1 ∧ · · · ∧#piχm)),
from which it follows (using S5K) that
`DTEL (Kψ1 ∧ · · · ∧Kψn)→ K(#pi> → ¬#pi(χ1 ∧ · · · ∧ χm)).
Observe that #pi> → ¬#piχ is propositionally equivalent to #pi> → (¬#piχ ∧#pi>), and by (¬-PCpi) this is in turn equivalent in DTEL to #pi> → #pi¬χ.
Hence
`DTEL (Kψ1 ∧ · · · ∧Kψn)→ K(#pi> → #pi¬(χ1 ∧ · · · ∧ χm)),
so since Kψ1, . . . ,Kψn ∈ x, it follows that K(#pi> → #pi¬(χ1 ∧ · · · ∧ χm)) ∈
x. Since fpi(x) is defined, also #pi> ∈ x, so by (K-PCpi) we can deduce that#piK¬(χ1 ∧ · · · ∧ χm) ∈ x. We therefore have K¬(χ1 ∧ · · · ∧ χm) ∈ fpi(x), so
since z ∼ fpi(x), ¬(χ1 ∧ · · · ∧ χm) ∈ z, a contradiction. uunionsq
Back to the Truth Lemma: suppose inductively the result holds for ϕ and
let us show it holds for #piϕ. Observe that #piϕ ∈ x iff fpi(x) is defined and
ϕ ∈ fpi(x). By the inductive hypothesis, this is equivalent to (fpi(x), [fpi(x)]) |= ϕ;
by Lemma 5, this is in turn equivalent to (fpi(x), fpi[x]) |= ϕ, which by definition
holds iff (x, [x]) |= #piϕ. uunionsq
Completeness is an easy consequence: if ϕ is not a theorem of DTEL, then
{¬ϕ} is consistent and so can be extended by Lindenbaum’s lemma to some
x ∈ X; by Lemma 4, we have (X, x, [x]) 6|= ϕ. uunionsq
